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[top-politics] Re: Software initiatives
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Hey,
I think your disagreement (echard and Magnus) stems from the voting methods you advocate so that in essence I believe your arguments actually complement each other. In the case of AD’s continous voting approach, there is a need for a much more specific piece of soft to be integrated in the system as it determines the closing of a vote dynamically. This need for integration and crosstalk is absent from echarp’s approach as he is thinking of vote verification after the fact (if I am understanding both your arguments correctly), which indeed could be done with something as simple as an excel spreadsheet populated with the voting results.
One could imagine that different counting pieces of code could be certified by delegates handling voting methods in the system (trustworthiness solved, Magnus?) and used in parallel so as to ensure that should one counting system fail or be compromised, other systems may show the discrepancy and raise a red flag (satisfying mode of operation, echarp?). This way you would have the certification needed for results to be trustworthy while enjoying the added security of having several counting options, discrepancies in which would be a reasonnable basis for investigation into a possible manipulation or irregularity.
Best regards,
Serge
+2
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On Mon, Oct 23, 2006 at 03:19:12PM +0200, Serge wrote:
> I think your disagreement (echard and Magnus) stems from the voting > methods you advocate so that in essence I believe your arguments > actually complement each other.
Hopefully.
> In the case of AD’s continous voting approach, there is a need for a > much more specific piece of soft to be integrated in the system as it > determines the closing of a vote dynamically.
I also advocate continuous voting. But then I don’t consider that votes need to be closed.
> This need for integration and crosstalk is absent from echarp’s > approach as he is thinking of vote verification after the fact (if I > am understanding both your arguments correctly), which indeed could be > done with something as simple as an excel spreadsheet populated with > the voting results.
+1
“After” is verifiability. But it can and should occur at all time, in real time.
With luck every voter could be able to look up the results on different nodes, and see if his personal votes are correctly accounted for.
> One could imagine that different counting pieces of code could be > certified by delegates handling voting methods in the system > (trustworthiness solved, Magnus?) and used in parallel so as to ensure > that should one counting system fail or be compromised, other systems > may show the discrepancy and raise a red flag (satisfying mode of > operation, echarp?).
The mode of operation… I don’t have anything precise in mind. The point is just to have as many verification nodes as possible, then a consensus to define the result.
If that was to work properly, that system would organise in real time and wouldn’t need anything formal.
> This way you would have the certification needed for results to be > trustworthy while enjoying the added security of having several > counting options, discrepancies in which would be a reasonnable basis > for investigation into a possible manipulation or irregularity.
Investigation of course, and deliberation, conviction. Using computers and the simplest procedures possible, it should be possible to quickly determine what went wrong and how to correct it.
> Best regards, > > Serge
Sincèrement
echarp – http://leparlement.org/security
+1
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